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This working paper explores the influence of populist parties classified as radical right-
wing, anti-establishment or radical left-wing by the DEMOS project on policy making 
on migration in the 7th legislature (2014-2019), a period that coincided with increased 
migratory movements constructed as a ‘crisis’. Three legislative processes were 
selected for analysis: Regulation 2016/1624, which established the European Border 
and Coast Guard; the proposal for a relocation mechanism; and the European 
Parliament Resolution on The situation in the Mediterranean and the need for a holistic 
EU approach to migration.  The analytical steps taken included the analysis of a) 
contributions of populist MEPs in debates and explanations of voting in order to explore 
their discursive positioning on key aspects of migration policies b) amendments 
submitted to proposed legislation and resolution in order to explore their policy content 
and policy preferences of populist MEPs and parties c) their adoption or not at the 
committee and plenary stages of the parliamentary legislative process in order to assess 
the impact of populist parties on the decision making process. Further, these findings 
are compared to those related to the MEPs of parties not classified as populist.  
The findings suggest that the influence of radical right-wing and anti-establishment 
populist parties on migration policy making is limited, as few of their amendments are 
adopted at committee stage, let alone by the plenary. ‘Inclusive’ populist parties were 
more successful in this respect. Further, it is difficult to discern specific radical right-
wing populist positions. While the discourse and phrasing of policy proposals of such 
parties tend to be more extreme, core policy positions such as preserving the powers of 
member states and strongly supporting border controls are shared among mainstream 
right-wing and to an extent centrist parties and political groups. Further, populist tropes 
such as those invoking the people, condemning the elites and constructing the ‘other’ 
as threatening were articulated not only by MEPS of populist parties but also by those 
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ALDE Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe 
ANO ANO 2011 Party 
AfD Alternative for Germany 
CEAS Common European Asylum System 
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This working paper analyses the impact of populist parties on the policy making process 
in the context of the European Parliament and the themes in their discourses.  
The selection of parties draws partly on the classification developed in previous 
research by the DEMOS H2020 project, which classified parties into four groups: 
radical right-wing, (post-communist), radical left-wing and anti-establishment populist 
parties. Radical right-wing populist parties are defined as exclusionary, mostly 
authoritarian, nativist, using ‘conspiratory explanations of liberal democracy’ 
(Sotiropoulos et al 2019: 20). Radical left-wing populist parties are inclusionary, non-
authoritarian, adopting a radical democratic approach to politics with ’weak nativist 
appeal’. (Sotiropoulos et al 2019: 20).  Anti-establishment populist parties are defined 
as ‘non-authoritarian with weak nativist appeal’, sometimes with radical democratic 
populist while it it difficult to ascertain if they are exclusionary ‘due to their lack of 
ideology’ (Sotiropoulos et al 2019: 20).  For the purposes of this working paper, the 
first two categorisations have been merged, as the parties wherein are similar in that 
they are largely authoritarian1, exclusionary and nativist, features which have a 
significant impact in their positioning towards migration and migration policy.  
The full list of parties selected for this working paper is provided in Table 1. Some of 
the parties in the original DEMOS selection (e.g., VOX, Kukiz 15) were not included 
either because they were not elected to the European Parliament or the country in which 
they are elected is not in the European Union (i.e., Bosnia Herzegovina and Turkey). 
Further, most MEPs of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) joined another party in 2015, 
leaving just two in the AfD. 
The selected parties belong to different political groups. Fidesz was, at the time, the 
only member of the European People’s Party (EPP) group usually described as a centre-
 
1 Two of the parties in the radical right wing and radical right-wing grouping, the Danish People’s 
Party (DF) and Polish Law and Justice (PiS) are described as ‘non-authoritarian’ in Sotiropoulos et al 
(2019a). While this is more likely in the case of DF, research has argued that Law and Justice has 
strong authoritarian tendencies evidenced in its undermining of courts, media freedoms and gender 
rights (Fomina and Kucharczyk 2016; Kim 2021; Stubbs and Lendvai‐Bainton 2020; Żuk, Żuk and 
Plucinski, 2021) 





right party. Law and Justice (PiS), Danish People’s Party (DF), Alternative for 
Germany (AfD) and OLANO were members of the European Conservatives and 
Reformist group (ECR), while National Front (FN), the Freedom Party (FP) and Lega 
Nord (LN) were a part of the Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF) group, which 
included a spectrum of right-wing, conservative and radical right parties.  
Table 1: Selected parties 
Party Country Political Group 
Radical right-wing 
Alternative für Deutschland – Alternative for 
Germany (AfD) 
Germany European Conservatives and 
Reformists (ECR)  
Dansk Folkeparti - Danish People’s Party (DF) Denmark European Conservatives and 
Reformists (ECR) 
Fidesz – Magyar Polgári Szövetség - 
Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fidesz) 
Hungary European People’s Party (EPP) 
Partij voor de Vrijheid - Freedom Party (FP) Netherlands Europe of Nations and 
Freedom (ENF) 
Front National – National Front (FN) France Europe of Nations and 
Freedom (ENF) 
Prawo i Sprawiedliwość - Law and Justice (PiS) Poland  European Conservatives and 
Reformists (ECR) 
Lega Nord – Northern League (LN) Italy Europe of Nations and 
Freedom (ENF) 
Obyčajní ľudia a nezávislé osobnosti- Ordinary 
People and Independent Personalities 
(OLANO) 
Slovakia European Conservatives and 
Reformists (ECR) 
United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) UK Europe of Freedom and Direct 
Democracy (EFDD) 
Anti-Establishment 
ANO 2011 (ANO) Czech Republic  Alliance of Liberals and 
Democrats for Europe (ALDE) 
Lietuvos Respublikos Liberalų sąjūdis -Liberal 
Movement of the Republic of Lithuania  (LM) 
Lithuania Alliance of Liberals and 
Democrats for Europe (ALDE) 
Movimento 5 Stelle - Five Star Movement  
(M5S) 
Italy Europe of Freedom and Direct 
Democracy (EFDD) 





Tvarka ir teisingumas - Party of Order and 
Justice (TT). 
Lithuania Europe of Freedom and Direct 
Democracy (EFDD) 
Left wing 
Front de gauche - Left Front Initiative (LFI) France European United Left–Nordic 
Green Left (GUE-NGL) 
PODEMOS Spain European United Left–Nordic 
Green Left (GUE-NGL) 
Συνασπισμός Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς – 
Προοδευτική Συμμαχία - Coalition of the 
Radical Left – Progressive Alliance (SYRIZA) 
Greece European United Left–Nordic 
Green Left (GUE-NGL) 
 
Three of the selected parties – UKIP, Party of Order and Justice (TT) and Five Star 
Movement (M5S) – belong to the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD) 
group, despite UKIP being classified by the DEMOS project as a radical right-wing 
populist party, while the other two are characterised as anti-establishment parties with 
‘weak nativist appeal’ (Sotiropoulos et al 2019). Moreover, some MEPs of the above 
parties joined other political groups – either while remaining in the party (e.g. Bruno 
Gollnisch of FN stayed with the Non-Inscrits group when FN joined ENF) or by leaving 
the party and joining another political group (e.g. Janet Atkinson was expelled from 
UKIP and joined the ECR group). It can be observed, however, that radical right-wing 
and anti-establishment parties are members of four different political groups of the 
right-wing political space in the European Parliament. In contrast, all parties identified 
as radical left-wing populist – PODEMOS, SYRIZA and Left Front Initiative (LFI) – 
are in the same political group, the European United Left/Nordic Green Left 
(GUE/NGL). Two of the parties classified as anti-establishment – the Lithuanian 
Liberal Movement (LM) and the Czech ANO – are members of the political group 
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE).  
The data selection is based on purposive sampling. The selected three legislative 
processes reflected significant policy developments and debates in response to the 
migratory movements of 2015: 
a) Regulation 2016/1624, which established the European Border and Coast Guard, 
comprising of national forces and the EU agency Frontex  





b) the proposal for a Council Decision for Provisional measures in the area of 
international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece, which concerned the 
establishment of a relocation mechanism  
c) the European Parliament Resolution on The situation in the Mediterranean and the 
need for a holistic EU approach to migration 
Three documents were selected from each process: 
a) the amendments submitted by MEPs to the text proposed by the Commission at 
the Committee stage. In this, amendments can be submitted by single MEPs as well as 
by smaller or larger groups, from the same or different national parties or political 
groups (Baller 2017; Hurka 2017). This increases the possibility of smaller parties 
influencing the policy-making process, in contrast to the Plenary stage, where 
amendments must be submitted by a minimum of 40 MEPs, a political group or the 
Committee (Baller 2017; Hurka 2013)  
b) the debate on the proposed text 
b) the explanation on voting, which includes contributions by MEPs outlining why 
they or their party voted for or against a resolution or legislative proposal 
The analysis of the amendments submitted by the MEPs of various populist and non-
populist parties aimed at understanding the influence of populist parties/MEPs on the 
legislative policy process – if any – and how many amendments were incorporated in 
the final text adopted by the European Parliament. It also offered insights into what 
kind of policies populist and non-populist parties favoured (policy content). The 
analysis of the debates and the explanations of voting explored the policy positioning 
of populist parties and the key discourses on migration – for example, if they supported 
policies of control, adopted securitising narratives, or favoured less restrictive policies 
and emphasised access to protection. Further, the amendments and statements of the 
MEPs of selected populist parties were compared to those of other similar parties and 
to those by MEPs of other political groups so as to identify similarities and differences 
in proposed policies and discourses. 
The documents containing the amendments were read through and analysed to locate 
the amendments submitted by MEPs of the selected populist parties and categorise the 





proposed amendments according to the political group. The results of this analysis are 
presented in section 2. The documents of the debates and the explanation of voting were 
read through and statements by different MEPs were copied and pasted into excel sheets 
according to the classification of populist parties and the remaining political groups. As 
statements were in several languages, Google translate was used for translations into 
English.  
2 Contributions to policymaking: amendments by populist 
party MEPs 
 
Table 2 presents the number of amendments submitted by radical right-wing, anti-
establishment and left-inclusive populist parties, as well as by the political groups 
excluding the selected populist parties. A first observation is that several populist 
parties (AfD, DF, LM, TT, Podemos) submitted no amendments in any of the three 
legislative processes while FP and LFI submitted amendments with other populist 
parties but not on their own. A further pattern is the submission of amendments with 
MEPs of the political group the party belongs to: Fidesz with EPP, FN with ENF, 
SYRIZA and LFI with GUE/NGL. Overall, however, there were significant differences 
among the number of amendments submitted by the selected parties. Radical right-wing 
populist parties submitted few amendments with the exception of Fidesz, mainly with 
other EPP MEPs, while PiS and Lega Nord submitted a notable number of amendments 
in the Situation in the Mediterranean resolution. It is worth noting that the latter 
legislative process concerned a parliament resolution rather a legislative text, and a 
greater number of amendments were submitted by all populist parties and political 
groups. Among the anti- establishment parties, ANO and M5S were the most active, 
especially in the EBCG regulation and the Situation in the Mediterranean resolution. 
Nevertheless, the radical left-wing populist parties, in particular SYRIZA, are the most 
active in the amendment process, despite the fact that they political group they belong 
to had fewer MEPs (52) that ALDE (67) or ECR (70). 
 
 





Table 2: Amendments submitted by populist parties and political groups 
 
Party Relocation EBCG Situation in the Mediterranean 
Radical right-wing populist parties 
Alternative for Germany 0 0 0 
Danish People’s Party  0 0 0 
Fidesz 4 10 0 
Fidesz with other EPP MEPs 0 53 52 
Freedom Party  0 0 0 
Front National with Freedom Party 0 2 0 
Front National with other ENF MEPs 0 3 0 
Front National with Lega Nord and ENF MEPs 0 4 0 
Law and Justice   2 0 30 
Lega Nord  3 0 23 
OLANO with other ECR MEPs 0 0 23 
United Kingdom Independence Party 0 0 0 
Anti-Establishment populist parties 
ANO 2011  0  0 1 
ANO with other ALDE MEPs 0 65 30 
Five Star Movement – M5S 2 63 45 
Liberal Movement of the Republic of Lithuania  0 0 0 
Party of Order and Justice 0 0 0 
Radical left-wing parties  
Left Front Initiative  0 0 0 
Left Front Initiative with GUE/NGL  2 17 1 
PODEMOS 0 0 0 
SYRIZA 0 4 0 
SYRIZA with GUE/NGL MEPs 0 95 57 
SYRIZA with Left Front Initiative and GUE/NGL MEPs  26 10 110 
Political groups excluding populist parties 
ALDE 4 53 39 
ECR 33 66 147 
EFDD 0 0 49 
ENF 0 0 13 
EPP 34 188 266 
Greens 0 211 94 
GUE/NGL 0 30 99 
S&D 35 227 149 





2.1 International protection: provisional measures for the benefit of 
Italy and Greece 2015/0125(NLE)  
 
Few MEPs from the selected radical right-wing populist parties proposed amendments 
to the draft submitted by the Commission.  K. Gál of Fidesz submitted four 
amendments, one suggesting an overall policy statement referring to European Council 
conclusions which proposed emphasis on control policies and cooperation with third 
countries as well as relocation2 , two adding specific references to ‘unprecedented 
migration pressure’ in Hungary3, and one suggesting that relocations should be on a 
voluntary basis by member states4 . M. Jurek and K. M. Ujazdowski of PiS proposed 
the insertion of a clause allowing receiving MS to introduce their own criteria for 
relocation5 and reducing the number of relocated applicants6 . L. Fontana of LN, in 
addition to a clause defining relocation7 , proposed two amendments on taking into 
account the preferences of candidates for relocation and removing limits to relocation 
numbers8, contrasting the proposals of the other radical right-wing populist groups. 
While these two proposals appear to consider the rights and interests of refugees, they 
also serve the national interests of Italy, as a country of arrival that would benefit from 
the proposed law. Only one amendment by K. Gál, a reference to migratory pressures 
faced by Hungary9 was partially incorporated in the text agreed by the Parliament 
(European Parliament [EP] 2015b; 2015c). Nevertheless, it was not included in the final 
text of the decision, as agreed by the Commission, the Parliament and the Council 
(Council of the European Union 2015). 
 
2 Amendment [Am.] 32, European Parliament [EP] 2015a) 
3 Am. 44, 52, EP 2015a 
4 Am. 124 
5 Am. 68 
6 Am. 76 
7 Am. 116 
8 Am. 101, 102 
9 Am. 44 





Table 3: Success of amendment - Relocation Council Decision 
 
MEPs of parties in the ECR group which can be described as radical right-wing populist 
or nationalist conservative, such as the True Finns, New Flemish Alliance and the UK 
Conservative Party, submitted similar amendments. These rejected the proposed 
Council Decision as a whole10 and supported the position that relocation should take 
place on a voluntary and temporary basis for Member states and controlled to a greater 
extend by them11. They also opposed the consideration of applicants’ preferences and 
their right to choose where they are relocated12, criteria proposed by the Commission 
 
10 Am. 20 
11 Am. 30, 61, 127, 110, 130, 144 




Committee level & 
plenary 
Accepted in final 
adopted version 
Radical right-wing populist parties 
Fidezs 4 1 0 
Lega Nord 3 0 0 
PIS 2 0 0 
Anti-establishment  populist parties 
M5S 2 0 0 
Radical left-wing populist parties 
Left Front Initiative with 
GUE/NGL 
2 0 0 
SYRIZA with Left Front 
Initiative and GUE/NGL 
MEPs 
26 14 2 
Political groups excluding populist parties 
ALDE 4 1 1 
ECR 22 2 0 
EPP 34 17 7 
S&D 35 19 4 
Jointly submitted 
amendments 
7 6 1 





such as language, educational qualifications and vulnerability13 , and the imposition of 
obligations and penalties on Italy and Greece14. Other amendments doubted that people 
crossing EU borders to seek protection,15  stating instead that they pose threats to 
security,16 in a similar manner to discourses and justifications adopted in the debate and 
explanations of voting (EP 2015d, 2015e). Only two out of the 22 amendments 
submitted by parties in the ECR group, one inserting a reference to Directive 
2011/95/EU in the definition of ‘applicant’ for relocation and one adding the 
transmission of applicants’ fingerprints as a condition for relocation -   were 
incorporated in the text adopted by the Parliament but did not feature in the final text 
of the Council Decision (Council of the European Union 2015; EP 2015b; 2015c).  
Contrary to the amendments proposed by K. Gál of Fidezs, other EPP MEPs supported 
the idea of a binding permanent relocation mechanism for emergency situations17 . 
However, this position was not unanimous: for example, P. Csáky of the Slovakian 
Party of the Hungarian Community, A. Pabriks of the Latvian Unity party and T. 
Zdechovský of the Czech Christian and Democratic Union also supported the idea of 
voluntary relocation affording greater discretion to make decisions to member states,18 
suggesting a divide between EPP MEPs of Eastern European countries and those from 
other member states.  EPP MEPs also referenced the idea of the relocation mechanism 
enhancing solidarity and shared responsibility among member states19 while other 
amendments proposed that member states’ specific situations – such as migration 
histories, numbers of migrants and humanitarian visas issued - needed to be taken into 
account20 as well as citing increased migratory pressures21. Similar to the ERC group, 
MEPs of the EPP group did not support the right of candidates to reject relocation offers 
or chose their destination, although they allowed for some consideration of the 
candidates’ preferences, as well as skills, languages and family, especially since they 
serve the labour market needs of member states and integration22. Amendments 
 
13 Am. 89 
14 Am. 119, 158 
15 Am. 30, 53 
16 Am. 82 
17 Am. 34, 72, 111, 112, 123 
18 Am. 117, 135 
19 Am 35, 36, 75 
20 Am. 72, 78 
21 Αm. 60 
22 Am. 90, 92, 96, 97, 104, 107, 150 





submitted by EPP MEPs as well as joint ones between EPP and the Socialists & 
Democrats group (S&D)  sought to enhance the protection of children23 and prevent 
discrimination during the relocation process24 . At the same time, EPP MEPs also 
sought to incorporate references to EU control policies such as return,25 suggesting an 
attempt to securitise a legislative proposal aimed at creating a solidarity instrument. 17 
out of 34 of these amendments - on binding permanent emergency relocation 
mechanism, on skills, qualifications, family ties and preferences, safeguarding children, 
citing return and reception, participation of EU agencies, proposing the regular review 
of relocation places depending on migratory movements, proposing an evaluation 
mechanism and the transmission of fingerprints26 - were incorporated in the text agreed 
by the Parliament, and 7 - two concerning children, two on skills, qualifications, and 
family ties, and one each on citing return and reception, EU agencies and fingerprint 
transmission - in the final text adopted by the Commission and Council (EP2015c). 
This was the highest number of amendments present in the final text of the decision 
among all political groups. However, the Council decision did not adopt the EPP 
position on a binding, permanent mechanism, illustrating the influence of this body 
Council in the legislative process.  
K. Chysochonos of SYRIZA and C. Vergiat of LFI were involved in a total of 29 
amendments – 2 submitted by C. Vergiat with other MEPs of the GUE/NLG group, and 
26 with SYRIZA as well (Table 3).  In addition, they submitted two amendments jointly 
with MEPs from the ALDE and Green groups. The amendments focused in their 
majority on strengthening compliance to human rights, including to rights and needs of 
children and vulnerable refugees were respected in line with international and EU law,27 
that the preferences of candidates for relocation, as well as their family and social ties 
to MS were respected as much as possible and, if that was not feasible, their consent 
was explicitly sought28. Some were explicitly critical of the failures of EU responses 
and laws such as the Dublin regulation29, while others sought to reinforce the point that 
 
23 Am. 45, 84, 86, 91 
24 Am. 100, 118 
25 Am. 36, 62, 152 
26 Am, 34,36,72,84, 86, 90, 92, 100, 107, 111, 112, 123, 133, 135, 138, 159, 165 
27 Am. 55, 85, 88 [with ALDE and the Greens], 103, 140, 148 
28 Am. 88, 95 [with ALDE and Greens], 98, 99, 109 [with ALDE, S&D and the Greens], 137 
29 Am. 29, 40, 106 





potential candidates for relocation were likely recipients of international protection30  
and belonging to vulnerable groups including children and unaccompanied minors31. 
Other amendments suggested stronger solidarity towards Greece and Italy, for example 
through revising relocation numbers,32 increasing the number of overall relocation 
places,33 and avoiding punitive clauses34  and using the term ‘responsibility’ rather than 
‘burden’35. Fifteen of these amendments,36 - two each on citing criticisms of Dublin, 
the review of relocation arrangements due to changes in migratory movements, the 
preferences, needs and qualifications of applicants, replacing the term ’burden’ into 
‘responsibility’ and others on instability in neighbouring areas and increased 
displacements of Syrian and safeguarding human rights- were fully or partially 
incorporated in the text of the legislative proposal adopted by the Parliament (EP 
2015c). However, only 2 – on regional instability and the needs and qualifications of 
applicants - were adopted in the final text of the Decision (Council of the European 
Union 2015). Four joint amendments with the Greens and ALDE, three concerning 
children and unaccompanied minors and one the consent of applicants for relocation, 
were adopted at Committee level, but none in the final text (EP 2015c; Council of the 
European Union 2015). 
L. Ferrara of the M5S submitted two amendments, one suggesting an automating 
relocation mechanism if member states failed to indicate relocation places37 and the 
second proposing the periodic reporting on member states’ reception facilities for 
relocated refugees38. None of which were incorporated in the text agreed by the 
Committee. The remaining selected parties, including those belonging to the ALDE 
group, submitted no amendments. The ALDE group submitted only four amendments39 
one proposing a reference to the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the recitals,40 two 
 
30 Am. 51 
31 Am. 47, with ALDE & Greens) 
32 Am. 69, 120. 
33 Am. 73, 125 
34 Am. 64, 153 
35 Am. 74, 80 
36 Am. 33, 40, 51, 59, 64, 69, 74, 80, 85, 94, 98, 103, 120, 162 
37 Am. 136 
38 Am. 163 
39 Am. 27, 131, 164 
40 Am. 27 





on the cooperation between member states and EU agencies,41 and one the evaluation 
of compliance with fundamental right at EU borders42. Only the first of these was 
adopted in the text agreed by the Parliament and subsequently the final text (EP2015c; 
Council of the European Union 2015). The S&D group, apart from joint amendments 
mentioned above, submitted amendments referring to EU law instruments43, supporting 
solidarity,44 a ‘holistic’ policy combining both controls and legal routes45 , supporting 
a permanent mechanism46  taking into account applicants’ preferences, family ties and 
skills47 and the rights of stateless persons and children48 and increasing relocation 
places49. A Bulgarian and a Greek MEP submitted amendments referencing migratory 
pressures 50  faced in particular by south-eastern states51, supported territory and 
reception capacity as criteria for relocation52 , financial support for member states,53 the 
involvement of law enforcement agencies and security measures such as identification54 
and taking into account the interests of host states in the relocation process and its 
review55. These suggest that national interests play a part in the amendments process, 
as well as that the S&D group is likely to support both stronger controls as well as 
policies safeguarding human rights (Lapotin 2015, Frid Nielsen 2018). 19 of these 
amendments, including on migratory pressures, a holistic approach, a permanent 
mechanism, rights, solidarity, financial support, taking into account territory, reception 
capacity and family ties, EU legal instruments, identification, the interests of Italy and 
Greece were fully or partially successful (EP 2015b; 2015c). Yet just four – on 
migratory pressures, cultural and family ties, screening and allowing Italy and Greece 
to present their views in case of not meeting their targets - were incorporated in the final 
text of the Council Decision (Council of the European Union 2015) 
 
41 Am. 131, 164 
42 Am. 166 
43 Am. 28, 31, 57, 71 
44 Am. 54 
45 Am. 63 
46 Am. 65 
47 Am. 93, 102 
48 Am. 46, 87, 113, 115, 129, 132 
49 Am. 126 
50 Am. 42, 43 
51 Am. 37, 39, 50 
52 Am. 79, 134 
53 Am. 81,151 
54 Am. 83, 149 (EP 2015a) 
55 Am. 146, 157, 161 (EP 2015a) 





2.2 European Border and Coast Guard regulation 
 
The selected radical right-wing populist parties on the right submitted few amendments 
on the Commission proposal on the European Border and Coast Guard (Table 4). There 
were two groups submitting amendments which included MEPs from the radical right 
populist parties selected. The first included M. Le Pen and G. Lebreton of FN with 
either L. Fontana of LN, V. Maeijer of FP (although in just one amendment) or other 
MEPs of the ENF group. The second included K. Gál of Fidezs with other MEPs of the 
EPP group.  
The first group submitted amendments which overall aimed at curtailing Europeanised 
powers for border management or any reference to this effect from proposed text and 
reassert national powers for border control and the significance of national borders56. 
For instance, one such amendment stated that ‘the only effective way to meet these 
objectives [of maintaining free movement and security within the EU], however, is to 
re-establish national borders’57 (even though national borders were never abolished - 
the Schengen instruments removed internal border controls). Another proposed the 
deletion of the statement that ‘European integrated border management is central to 
improving migration management and ensuring a high level of internal security within 
the Union’58.  









Radical right-wing populist parties 
Fidesz with EPP MEPs 10 10 7 
Front National with 
Freedom Party 
2 0 0 
 
56 Am. 109, 112, 145 (EP 2016a); 466, 532 (EP 2016b) 
57 Am 109 (EP 2016a) 
58 Am. 112 (EP 2016a) 
59 The text adopted the parliament was consequently adopted by the Council without changes.  





Front National with 
Lega Nord and ENF 
4 0 0 
Front National with 
ENF 
3 0 0 
Anti-establishment populist parties 
ANO with ALDE MEPs 53 19 15 
M5S 63 14 9 
Radical left-wing populist parties 
Left Front Initiative 
with GUE/NGL 
17 0 0 
SYRIZA with Left Front 
Initiative and 
GUE/NGL MEPs 
10 2 1 
SYRIZA with and 
GUE/NGL MEPs 
95 27 18 
Political groups excluding populist parties 
ALDE 65 19 15 
ECR 66 3 1 
EPP 189 48 40 
Greens 212 77 58 
GUE/NGL 30 3 2 
S&D 227 93 58 
Jointly submitted 
amendments  
24 14 11 
 
Other amendments concerned a supervisory role for member states over the Agency,60 
the power to reject liaison officers appointed by the Agency 61 and removing the binding 
effect of proposals by the executive director on member states 62.  Another referred to 
‘intense migratory pressures at the EU’s external borders’,63 reinforcing securitarian 
 
60 Am. 143 (EP 2016a) 
61 Am. 466 (EP 2016b) 
62 Am. 532 (EP 2016b) 
63 Am. 244 (EP 2016a) 





constructions of migratory movements. None of these amendments were included in 
the regulation text adopted at the committee stage (European Parliament 2016c). 
The amendments submitted by Fidezs, mostly with other EPP MEPs (mainly A. 
Pabriks, M. Hohlmeier and J. Lenaers), aimed at increasing the powers of the Council 
– hence the of member states and limiting those of the Commission64. One amendment 
aimed at ensuring member states entered data into EU databases65 -while others 
proposed more responsibilities for the Agency – for example on compensation for 
damage or harm caused by the Agency’s actions and omissions, including of members 
of national forces66, a definition for the terms ‘third parties’67, ensuring the 
compatibility of equipment68 and deciding on the selection of border guards for rapid 
response operations69. All ten amendments submitted by the group of MEPs including 
K. Gál of Fidesz were accepted at committee stage (EP 2016c). Seven of them – on 
strengthening council powers and limiting those of the commission, data entry and 
equipment compatibility - were incorporated in the text of the resolution agreed by the 
plenary (EP 2016f). In contrast to the relocation decision, the position adopted with 
Fidesz was aligned with the majority of the EPP group in that it supported the creation 
of a European Border and Coast Guard, as it enhanced border control capacities, but 
with national powers being preserved to a greater extent than in the Commission 
proposal.   
Amendments proposed by MEPs of parties of the ECR groups not included in the 
DEMOS populist - by G. Van Orden of the UK Conservative Party, on his own or with 
a group of MEPs including T. Kirkhope of the same party, S. Stevens of the New 
Flemish Alliance, A. Dzhambazki of Bulgaria without Censorship, J. Halla-aho of the 
Finn’s Party, and M. Macovei of M10 - were similar in content with those of the 
selected populist parties. They also sought to preserve state powers,70  although with 
some exceptions for members states with external borders, in the case of the proposed 
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67 Am. 261 (EP 2016b) 
68 Am. 867 (EP 2016d) 
69 Am. 690 (EP 2016d) 
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vulnerability assessment - undermine human rights safeguards71, assert the importance 
of migration and border controls and strengthening such measures, including internal 
border controls72 . Three amendments – preserving national powers and penalising 
states with external borders were incorporated in the text agreed at Committee level, 
but only one – limiting the role of Frontex to assistance in screening procedures – was 
adopted in the text agreed by the plenary (EP 2016f).  
Many amendments proposed by other MEPs of the EPP party (e.g. A.M.C. Bildt, R. 
Dati and B. Hortefuex, M. Gabriel, E. Radev) were in the same vein with those 
submitted by the group including K. Gál in that they supported protecting the powers 
of member states73, while others were geared towards increasing the capacities of the 
agency and the Commission and cooperation with other European agencies74, 
obligations of MS with external borders75 and even creating stronger sanctions for 
member states76. Two amendments concerned preserving free movement77 . EPP MEPs 
also submitted amendments geared towards safeguarding children and vulnerable 
groups and humanitarian issues such as search and rescue, often with other political 
groups, such as ALDE, S&D, ECR and the Greens78. However, EPP MEPs also 
proposed amendments referring to security threats and using securitarian language79 
(e.g. ‘hybrid threats’), proposed reinforced control functions80 and limiting 
humanitarian and human rights obligations81. Such amendments were submitted by 
MEPs to parties often identified as centre right such as the Greek New Democracy or 
the French UMP., 48 out of 189 amendments by the EPP group, excluding those 
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submitted with the participation of Fidesz were incorporated in the text adopted by the 
Committee, and 40 in the text agreed by the plenary (EP 2016c; 2016f).  
P. Jezek of the Czech party ANO submitted 65 amendments as part of a larger team of 
MEPs belonging to the ALDE group. These were on the whole geared towards 
strengthening supranational arrangements although in a manner preserving the powers 
of member states82   but also strengthening humanitarian and human rights 
obligations,83 including with the incorporation of search and rescue in the Agency’s 
tasks, and accountability84 . It is difficult to draw any conclusions regarding ANO as a 
‘centrist’ populist party other than that their representative was not named in some 
amendments supported by the wider ALDE group85 strengthening supranational 
arrangements and limiting the powers of member states86 –for example related to the 
role of the Frontex Management Board, where state ministries and police bodies are 
represented - as well as supporting stronger fundamental rights and procedural 
safeguards87 . Out of 65 amendments he was involved in, 19 – on SAR, child protection, 
the roles of member states and EU bodies, and others on the functioning of Frontex 
mechanisms -were fully or partially adopted in the Committee text (EP 2016c). 15 – 
apart from one concerning human rights and three proposing different names for 
Frontex mechanisms – were incorporated in the text agreed by the plenary (EP 2016f).  
Two MEPs from SYRIZA and LFI, K. Chrysogonos and M.C. Vergiat, were involved 
in the amendments process. They submitted in total 126 amendments mostly with other 
members of the GUE/NGL group, suggesting that left inclusive populist parties were 
more heavily involved in the process than radical right-wing ones (Table 3). These 
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proposed reinforcing the role of compliance to fundamental rights and asylum law88,  
strengthening sea rescue89, enhancing accountability90 and acknowledged the need for 
specific protections for groups with specific vulnerabilities and needs91. Others aimed 
at curtailing the powers proposed for the EBCGA92, such as in the field of return and 
cooperation with third countries93, but also to increase participation and oversight by 
the Commission and Parliament94. 31 amendments, mainly on human rights and 
accountability were accepted at committee level and 21 in the final text, suggesting a 
degree of influence in the legislative process, given the relatively small size of the 
GUE/NGL group (EP 2016c; 2016f). Interestingly, some of the amendments that were 
not adopted in the final text concerned the strengthening of human rights accountability 
mechanisms of Frontex, which has since proven one of the most significant weaknesses 
in the operation of the Agency (Karamanidou and Kasparek 2020; Frontex Scrutiny 
Working Group 2021). There are few other amendments95 by the GUE/NGL group that 
do not involve K. Chrysogonos or M.C. Vergiat.  
Amendments submitted by M5S were similar to those of the GUE/NGL group in that 
they aimed at strengthening human rights safeguards96 including strengthening 
provisions for vulnerable groups97 and supported sea rescue capacities98, 
accountability99 and limiting the powers of the agency100. Despite belonging to a small 
political group like other populist parties, 13 of their amendments,101 mainly on human 
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rights, were incorporated in the text agreed at committee level, and 9 in the final text. 
Again, the difference might be that their amendments were better aligned to those of 
other party groups.  
 
2.3 The Situation in the Mediterranean resolution 
 
Unlike the other two legislative processes, the Situation in the Mediterranean was a 
resolution, a text recounting the collective position of the parliament and making policy 
proposals to other EU institutions (Oğuz 2020) and not an agreed position on proposed 
new legislation. Therefore, the amendments and debates covered a wider range of 
migration policy issues than the other two texts. While more amendments were 
submitted than in the other two processes, far fewer were adopted (Table 5). To a large 
extent, the text of the committee already included a range of positions that reflected the 
policy preferences of mainstream political groups, such as support for stronger 
measures for guarding the external borders and Europeanised policies of asylum and 
relocation.  
Table 5:  Success of amendments – the Situation in the Mediterranean resolution 
 
Party Amendments submitted Amendments adopted102 
Radical right-wing populist parties 
Fidesz with EPP MEPs 45 1 
Fidesz with EPP and ECR 
MEPs 
8 0 
Law and Justice 30 0 
Lega Nord 23 0 
OLANO with ECR MEPs 23 0 
Anti-establishment populist parties 
ANO 1 0 
ANO with ALDE MEPs 30 7 
 
102 Unlike in the previous two legislative processes, the text adopted at the Committee level was the 
same as the final text.  





M5S 45 1 
Radical left-wing populist parties 
Left Front Initiative with 
GUE/NGL 
1 0 
SYRIZA with Left Front 
Initiative and GUE/NGL 
MEPs 
110 8 
SYRIZA with GUE/NGL MEPs 57 2 
Political groups   
ALDE 39 3 
ECR 147 0 
EFDD 49 0 
ENF 13 0 
EPP 266 12 
Greens 94 6 
GUE/NGL 56 2 





Furthermore, amendments on children and unaccompanied minors submitted jointly by 
political groups were by far the most successful, with half of them being incorporated 
in the resolution text (Table 5). 
Four of the selected radical right-wing parties submitted amendments: PiS, OLANO 
with other MEPs of the ECR group, LN and Fidesz. Amendments proposed by PiS, 
OLANO and LN opposed harmonised policies and solidarity measures103, including 
relocation and resettlement,104 rejected calls in the initial text of the resolution to reform 
the Dublin regulation105 and pushed for member states to retain control of migration 
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policies106. Some amendments call for solidarity to be linked to responsibility and for 
sanctions for member states that fail to implement adequate controls.107 However, LN 
amendments refer to failures of relocation and solidarity108 and do not oppose relocation 
or Dublin reform as a measure,109 suggesting differences in the perception of national 
interests in Eastern European countries and Italy. A PiS MEP, K. M. Ujazdowski, 
similarly submitted an amendment referring to an increase of refugees from Ukraine,110 
an issue specific to Poland.  
Amendments submitted by the PiS, OLANO and LN MEPs also expressed support for 
reinforced border controls,111 and in particular combatting smuggling and trafficking,112 
return113 as well as externalised policies intended to prevent migratory movements to 
Europe114. Such proposals are accompanied by amendments which depict migratory 
phenomena as linked to crime and terrorism115 and threatening to the economy and 
demography of European countries.116 Amendments submitted by PiS also touched on 
the persecution and insecurity of Christian populations, reinforcing in this manner the 
emphasis on religion as a point of difference from migrant populations117. Other 
amendments oppose strengthening access to asylum, human rights safeguards, and 
refugee rights118 and oppose sea rescue119 and evoke ‘undeservingness’, claiming that 
refugees are in fact economic migrants and willing participants to criminal activities 
such as smuggling120. None of these amendments were adopted (EP 2016k; 2016l). 
Amendments by other  ECR, ENF & EFDD MEPs are by and large in a similar vein to 
those submitted by MEPs of the selected parties, calling for stricter and expanded 
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control policies121, opposing common policies and privileging the national level122 - 
although also penalising member states  for control failures,123 combatting 
smuggling,124 opposing relocation and solidarity,125 constructing migration and 
migrants as threatening to the security and economic wellbeing of European 
societies126, undeserving of protection and complicit to smuggling,127 opposing the 
expansion of asylum and refugee rights128 and sea rescue,129 to the point of asking for 
the criminalisation of Search and Rescue [SAR] NGOs,130 a policy criminalising 
solidarity that was implemented by several governments across Europe in the following 
years (Casumano and Villa 2021; Dadusc and Mudu 2020; P. Schack and Witcher 
2021). Some of these amendments employ extreme language (e.g. ‘jihadists’131) or 
propose measures that would violate EU law, such as pushbacks and returns without 
due process.132 As with the selected populist parties, none of these amendments were 
incorporated into the final text of the resolution (EP 2016k; 2016l).  
Fidezs, represented by K. Gál, submitted amendments with a wider group of EPP MEPs 
from predominantly Eastern European parties, which submitted 45 amendments and a 
further 8 which included an ECR MEP. In contrast to the other selected radical right-
wing parties, their amendments betray less hostility to relocation and resettlement 
although these measures are accepted only as a temporary and voluntary, with member 
states retaining control.133 They supported an expanded notion of solidarity involving a 
range of measures in addition to relocation,134 but exclude SAR as an expression of 
solidarity, sought to de-link it from solidarity, link it to border controls and weaken 
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provisions for permanent, proactive mechanisms.135 Similarly to other parties discussed 
previously, they also oppose the reform of the Dublin regulation, designating its 
implementation as the key problem136 and a weaker role for EU institutions in asylum 
and migration policies137, also illustrated by amendments to remove references to a 
range of EP working documents on shared EU policies on asylum smuggling, Frontex, 
resettlement and gender equality138. Like ECR/EFDD/ENF, they support intensified 
border controls, including further militarisation, and deportations, including 
Europeanised ones not least as a way to maintain public support,139 and limiting access 
to asylum and human rights140, as well as stressing the responsibilities of asylum 
seekers141. While they avoid the overt criminalisation and securitisation present in the 
amendments of the selected populist parties and right-wing political groups, they also 
designate migration as a threat, in particular to the economy, while dismissing clauses 
invoking the contribution of migration in these domains.142 Just one of these 
amendments143, referring to the obligations of refugees, was partially incorporated in 
the final text.  
Amendments submitted by other EPP MEPs sometimes reflected contradictory 
positions. For example, some saw SAR as an obligation144 and noted EU failures in this 
area145  while others, like the group of MEPs Fidesz was involved in, disengage it from 
definitions of solidarity146 . Some support that MS retain powers and oppose the further 
Europeanisation of policies and capacities, for example in border controls, 
humanitarian admission and labour migration147 although others support cooperation 
with EU agencies and Europeanised controls148 regret insufficient implementation of 
common policies (837, 842) as well as the penalisation of MS (usually with external 
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borders) which do not fully implement common policies149.  Likewise, EPP MEPs from 
Bulgaria called for the overhaul of the Dublin system150 , while others do not, even if 
there’s some acknowledgement of its failures151.  Further, while proposed amendments, 
predominantly joint with other political groups, stress the right of children and 
women152, others limit access to asylum and human rights153 even calling for the 
revision of the Geneva convention154. One of them goes as far as requesting the 
suspension of asylum applications in emergency circumstances of high arrivals155 . 
Other amendments are similar to those Fidesz was involved. For example, they also 
supported relocation and resettlement as voluntary and temporary measures, taking into 
account the preferences of member states (but not of asylum seekers)156, although some 
oppose it more strongly157. Solidarity is similarly perceived as voluntary and extended 
to encompass shared responsibilities in border control158. EPP MEPs are strongly in 
favour of reinforcing border controls159 which they prioritise over sea rescue160 
combatting smuggling161, the hotspot approach162 returns163, and externalised control 
measures, including keeping refugees close to their countries of origin and outside the 
EU164. While not overtly hostile to migration, they also highlight security threats165 and 
the ‘deservingness’ of migrants166. Some amendments are close to the policy positions 
of the selected and other parties in the ECR/EFDD/ENF groups, highlighting threats to 
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EU identities and values and demand migrants’ respect and compliance with them167. 
Therefore, as in the case of the other two legislative processes, the positions of EPP 
MEPs vary in terms of how restrictive and Europeanised policies should be. 12 
amendments by EPP MEPs,168 four concerning the re-ordering of citations and other on 
conditions in countries of origin, deaths in the Mediterranean, slow relocation 
processes, provisions for children and vulnerable people, integration and hotspots, were 
incorporated partly or fully into the final text (EP2016l).  
Just one MEP from the populist parties in the ALDE group, P. Jezek from ANO, 
participated in the amendments process. He submitted one amendment on his own, on 
the commission considering activation of the Temporary Protection Directive, which 
was not adopted.169 The rest of the amendments in which he is named were submitted 
by the wider ALDE group. Some of them were geared towards supporting Europeanised 
control measures – border controls,170 including the participation of non-Schengen 
states,171 combatting smuggling,172 return173 and externalised controls174 to prevent 
departures to Europe. Several amendments concern facilitating integration175 while 
others aim at safeguarding human rights176 and enhancing budgetary oversight177.  7 out 
of 23 amendments, one each on children’s rights, return, Schengen states’ participation, 
budgetary oversight and three on integration, were fully or partially adopted.  In 
addition, several amendments by the ALDE core group excluding P. Jesek concerned 
strengthening human rights safeguards and accountability,178 opposed the 
criminalisation of humanitarian assistance in the Facilitation Directive179 and called for 
ensuring legal routes180. Three amendments, on the non-criminalistation of 
humanitarian assistance and Europeanised responses to returns and the shortcomings of 
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the Dublin Regulation, were successful (EP 2016k).  They are in favour of 
strengthening EU level responses181, although they acknowledge pressures on external 
member states and within the Dublin System182, and adopt a concept of solidarity that 
involves regional and local levels of governance183.  Amendments submitted by other 
ALDE MEPs – such as P. Nart of the Spanish Citizens – Party of the Citizenry and a 
group of MEPs of the Finnish Centre Party – were  closer to EPP or even 
ECR/EFDD/ENF proposals, for example preventing entry by keeping refugees in 
countries of origin and transit,184  citing their obligations,185  solidarity and relocation 
being voluntary,186 MS maintaining powers in border control over Frontex,187  opposing 
the revision of the Facilitation Directive188  and a common system for asylum 
applications,189  and screening and refusal of entry at the external borders.190  None of 
these amendments were adopted. 
Radical left-wing populist parties were again heavily involved in the legislative process. 
While the LFI representative, C.M. Vergiat submitted only one amendment with other 
GUE/NGL MEPs, she and K. Chrysogonos of SYRIZA together with other members 
of the group submitted 110, and SYRIZA with GUE/NGL a further 57.  Their 
amendments focused predominantly on strengthening human rights provisions and 
safeguards, including in externalised policies and in the labour market191. They  
included references to international and EU law, EU policy papers, but also to reports, 
recommendations and studies by human rights bodies such as FRA and OHCHR192 (this 
is also evident in amendments submitted by the Greens group).193 While they supported 
common standards aiming at improving access to protection194, they were critical of 
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common policies on controls that limit access to asylum, return, detention and the 
hotspot approach195, as well as of the Dublin Regulation, acknowledging burdens posed 
on member states with external borders.196 They also called for strengthening SAR 
provisions, highlighting the failures of Frontex and opposing the role of military 
navy,197 and ensuring legal routes into the EU as a way to combat smuggling and border 
deaths.198 In contrast to other political groups, GUE/NGL amendments proposed an 
understanding of solidarity as centred on asylum seekers rather than states, taking into 
account their preferences in relocation and resettlement and safeguarding their rights in 
the process199. They also support the greater involvement of civil society in all aspects 
of policy200 and opposed the criminalisation of NGOs for SAR activities.201 Equally, 
they ask for greater transparency202 and acknowledge the labour demographic needs for 
migration.203 Despite the high number of amendments, just 8 of those submitted by the 
LFI, SYRIZA, and GUE/NGL MEPs were adopted, including three proposals to 
introduce  citations of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, a Commission 
document on External Action and an IOM project, one each on climate change and 
budgetary accountability, and three on human rights safeguards204. A further two 
amendments submitted by SYRIZA and GUE/NGL MEPs, one on inserting a legal 
definition of children and a reference to burdens placed on states with external borders, 
were also successful. 205  Excluding the selected populist parties, GUE/NGL MEPs 
submitted a further 99 amendments. While many were similar to those submitted by the 
‘core’ GUE/NGL in which SYRIZA and LFI participated206and one of these, on 
unaccompanied minors, was successful207 others were more critical of EU police and 
made more radical proposals. Amendments submitted by Spanish MP J. Pimenta Lopes 
were more critical of failures of solidary, such as in relation to relocation as well as 
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resettlement policies,208 calling for unconditional granting of protection instead, 209 the 
abolition rather than reform of the Dublin system210, and rejected policies of control, 
and in particular the militarisation of border controls211 and at the same time common 
European policies212.  None of these amendments were successful. 
To an extent, the amendments submitted by the M5S MEPs also supported that MS 
states maintain powers in some aspects of asylum police such as separate safe third 
country lists213 but also supported harmonisation of Common European Asylum System 
[CEAS]214and a binding, permanent relocation mechanism215 and criticised the Dublin 
system216. Other amendments are similar to those submitted by the GUE/NGL group, 
supporting human rights217, search and rescue218 and legal routes219 and opposing the 
criminalisation and militarisation of SAR activities220. Several amendments addressed 
root causes through development aid aimed at improving socioeconomic conditions and 
asylum systems in countries of origin221. Just one of these,222 supporting the revision of 
the Dublin system, was adopted. 
Amendments submitted by the S&D group are similar to those of the GUE/NGL group 
in that they also safeguarding human rights223, support legal routes224 SAR225 and 
facilitating integration226. They are however more supportive of Europeanised asylum 
and control policies, including return and hotspots227, and unlike GUE/NGL they do 
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not object to SAR operations involving military actors228. Safeguarding asylum and 
human rights and sea rescue is also the focus of amendments submitted by the Greens 
229, who similarly to the GEU/NGL and S&D groups are critical of the absence of legal 
routes, the effects of prioritising controls on access to protection, the Dublin system 230 
and supportive of legal routes, strong integration policies, civil society engagement, 
and of solidarity and permanent relocation mechanisms that acknowledge the 
preferences of asylum seekers231. 8 amendments by the S&D group232, including 
references to the European Migrant Smuggling Centre of Europol and the Union Civil 
protection mechanism, humanitarian visas, the Dublin system, solidarity, integration, 
Frontex accountability and tackling labour exploitation, were fully or partially adopted 
in the final text. The Greens had 6 amendments, a proposal to include a citation of the 
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, references to climate change and UNHCR 
resettlement data, humanitarian admission, integration and safeguards on detention, that 
were fully or partially adopted.   
3 Discourses and policy preferences 
 
One commonality among all political groups is that narratives of ‘crisis’ are largely 
shared both by actors classified as populist, including the selected parties and by seen 
as mainstream (2015d; 2015e; 2016m; 2016n;2016o;2016n). The narrative of a 
migration or refugee ‘crisis’, a dominant one across the EU since 2015 (Jeandesboz and 
Pallister-Wilkins 2016) is a context within which the debates on the three proposals 
take place. Beyond this general frame, the selected populist parties employ a range of 
constructions and policy preferences.    
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3.1 Radical right-wing populist parties 
 
Support for controlling migration and borders is a dominant discursive theme among 
the MEPs of the selected radical right-wing populist parties in all three legislative 
processes (e.g. K. Gál, K. M. Ujazdowski, PiS EP 2016m; L.Aliot, FN, T.Aker, UKIP, 
A. Bocskor, Fidesz,  EP 2016n; N. Bay, FN, B. Škripek, OLANO,  K. M. Ujazdowski, 
PiS, K. Gál, Fidesz,  G. Batten, UKIP EP 2016o; J. Girling EP 2016p; B. von Storch 
AfD, B. Gollnisch FN 2015d M. Troszczynski, M. Le Pen, S. Goddyn FN, J. 
Wiśniewska PiS EP 2015e;).   
Parliament should clearly define to whom Europe's doors are open, that is, 
firstly, to refugees in danger of their lives from areas of fighting and, secondly, 
to ensure, in cooperation with all Member States, that external borders are 
controlled. (B. Škripek, EP2016o) 
We need to strengthen and protect our external borders. That is why I consider 
it important that, after several months of inactivity, decisive action has been 
taken to alleviate the pressure on immigrants on the Western Balkans route. We 
need to stop the uncontrolled entry of hundreds of thousands into the territory 
of the Union, as we have all seen recently how serious the security risks are 
(K.Gal 2016o) 
Even if some MEPs adopt humanitarian narratives, expressing concern for legislation 
encouraging ‘perilous journeys’, these need to be addressed through control policies, 
including combatting smuggling and trafficking (e.g. B.Skripek, M. D'Ornano, EP 
2016o; N. Bay, F. Philippot, FN, J. Arnott, UKIP, EP 2016p; J. Arnott, J. Carver, UKIP, 
S. Goddyn, 2015e; B Etheridge, UKIP 2015e). Beyond controls at the external border, 
one policy preference that emerges from the Situation in the Mediterranean debate is 
keeping refugees outside the European Union (K. Gál EP 2016o; M. Borghezio, LN, B. 
von Storch 2015e), showing support for externalised migration policies. Further, some 
FN members specifically ask for an ‘Australian solution’ - which involves refusal of 
entry and extraterritorial detention and processing - of preventing all unauthorised 
migration into the EU (S. Goddyn, J.-F. Jalkh, M. Le Pen, F. Philippot 2016n; S. Woolfe 
UKIP, EP 2016p).  While there is consensus on controlling the migration and borders 
as a policy priority,  FN and UKIP in particular are also opposed to the abolition of 
internal border controls in the Schengen area of free movement, in particular among 
MEPs of FN and UKIP who consider it responsible for secondary movements within 





the European Union (e.g. L.Aliot, M-C. Arnautu, M. Le Pen, FN EP 2016m; N. Bay, 
FN 2016o; S. Woolfe, G. Batten, J. Seymour UKIP, EP 2016p).  
Radical right-wing populist parties on the whole reject EU policies on migration. One 
key argument is that  EU policies fail to control migration(e.g. K. Gál EP 2016m; N. 
Bay, EP 2016o; E. Czesak,  K. Złotowski, PiS,  B. Škripek, OLANO, R. Paksas, TT, 
EP 2016p;) opting for overtly ‘open’ migration policy (V. Maeijer, FP, B. Škripek, 
OLANO, EP 2015d B. Etheridge, Steven Woolfe, UKIP EP 2015e; N. Bay, FN, G. 
Batten, UKIP, M. Jurek, PiS 2016o) and thus endanger the security of European 
countries:  
All you are proposing is to create more opportunities to come to the European 
Union. Holistic, in the sense of all-encompassing, you are taking it very literally 
by inviting the whole world to come here. Not a single proposal to end asylum 
inflation, nothing about IS terrorists travelling with asylum seekers to cause 
death and destruction (V. Maeijer, FP, EP 2016o). 
The above quotation exemplifies two discursive themes employed by radical right-wing 
parties. EU migration policy has been long predicated in various forms of control of 
movement at the borders of Europe and beyond and within its territory (De Genova 
2017; Karamanidou, Kasparek and Hess 2020; Mezzandra and Neilson 2013). Yet, 
radical right-wing parties depict such policies as failed, invoking the intensity of 
movement and perceptions of threat.  Similarly, relocation is opposed because would 
act as a ‘pull factor’, encouraging more people to enter EU countries in an unauthorised 
manner (S. Woolfe, J. Arnott, UKIP, S. Goddyn EP 2015e). Such views are shared 
among the wider ECR, ENF and EFDD (with the exception of M5S) political groups 
(e.g. H. Stevens, 2016o; D. Dalton, J. Girling EP 2016p; G. Mayer, 2016n; U. 
Trebesius, R. Sulik 2015e).  In a similar vein, it was argued that relocation would 
encourage movement to MS with better social provisions, as refugees would not wish 
to stay in MS they did not chose (Fidesz 2015e). For similar reasons, MEPs from the 
selected populist parties opposed proposals in the Situation in the Mediterranean 
resolution which expressed support for more liberal family reunification policies (e.g. 
N. Bay EP 2016o). 
The emphasis placed on controlling migration is underpinned by constructions of 
migration as a threat. Migration is depicted as a problem (M. D’Ornano, N. Bay, FN, 
EP 2016o; L. Aliot, S. Briois, FN EP 2016p) and even as an ‘evil’:  





Since immigration comes from an evil, which are often wars or poverty, it is 
clear that good cannot come from evil (L Fontana, EP 2016o) 
More specifically, the securitisation of migration relies on perceptions of it as an 
economic, cultural and security threat.  Constructions of economic threat depict 
migration and migrants as affecting the employment and economic wellbeing of 
citizens (e.g. I. Gáll-Pelcz, Fidezs, D. Bilde, M. D’Ornano FN, EP 2015e; 2016p; D. 
James, UKIP, L. Fontana, LN, 2015e; S. Briois, FN, EP 2016p).:  
These new arrivals, most often motivated by economic reasons, will enter into 
direct competition with the Europeans that are the most disadvantaged in the 
field of access to work, to health and to housing. (S Goddyn, FN, 2015e) 
The people who will see their wages reduced, their jobs displaced, the poor, the 
homeless and the people who have no voice in Europe will be the ones who suffer 
because of the arrogance of people in this Chamber. (S Woolfe, UKIP 2015e) 
Radical right-wing populist MEPs invoke threats to European identity (M. D'Ornano, 
FN, M. Jurek, PiS, 2016o; M. Borghezio, LN 2015e), including to the Christian 
character of Europe (B. Skripek, OLANO, 2015e; 2016o) and bringing ‘social 
decomposition’ (M. Jurek 2016o; also M. D’Ornano 2016p). Muslim populations are 
constructed as a dangerous Other who are ‘are clearly incompatible with our liberal 
western democracies’, explicitly referencing nativist concerns of European populations 
being ‘replaced’ (e.g. L. Fontana, LN, 2016o; also V. Maeijer, FP, EP 2016o; S. 
Goddyn EP 2016p).  Elsewhere, cultural threats, associated with Muslim populations, 
are merged with security ones.  
when these people arrive here, a period of integration is needed. I saw that it 
says that it is a two-way process, no, it is a one-way process, they are the ones 
who have to integrate with us because otherwise cases like Molenbeek happen. 
(L. Fontana, LN, 2016o) 
That it might be one of the 4,000 terrorists of the Islamic State who came in 
with those illegal immigrants, is not mentioned and critical questions are out of 
the question. (V. Maeijer, FP EP 2015e). 
Threats to security, especially linked to terrorism – alluded above through the reference 
to Molenbeek – are specifically cited by several MEPs (e.g. D. James, UKIP, V. 
Maeijer, FP; B. Škripek OLANO 2015e; J. Carver, 2015e; V. Maeijer EP 2016o; K. 
Złotowski, PiS, all UKIP MEPs EP 2016p; B. Gosiewska PiS, n. Morano, FN EP 





2016n; J. Carver UKIP, EP 2015e).  Perceptions of threat are increased through the use 
of language depicting migration as a natural phenomenon, such as ‘influx’ (all Fidezs) 
and ‘flow’ (J. Wiśniewska, PiS, D. Bilde, P. Loiseau FN; B. Gosiewska K. M. 
Ujazdowski, PiS, B. Škripek OLANO EP 2016n; K. M. Ujazdowski, Marek Jurek EP 
2016m), and in one extreme instance ‘tsunami’ (N. Bay FN 2015e).  A further 
construction put forward by right wing populist MEPs evolves around deservingness. 
UKIP MEPs for example claimed that people on the move are not ‘genuinely seeking 
asylum’ (B Etheridge) or ‘genuine refugees’ (S. Woolfe, B. Etheridge, UKIP L. Fontana 
LN 2015e) but ‘migrants who have entered European countries illegally’ (D. James, 
2015e; also V. Maeijer FP 2015e) or are considered economic migrants (M. Bizzotto 
LN 2015d). K. Gál of Fidezs similarly stated that ‘only a fraction of the masses heading 
for Europe are real refugees’ (EP 2016o). MEPs of FN also evoke illegality through the 
use of the label ‘clandestins’ (‘illegals’) (D. Bilde, S. Briois, M. D’Ornano, S. Goddyn, 
D. Martin 2015e). 
Another key theme in the discourse and policy preferences of radical right parties 
concerns the tensions between Europeanised policies and national sovereignty. 
Relocation measures were  seen as ‘taking away sovereignty from the nation states’ (B. 
Etheridge, UKIP) limiting their ability to decide on migration policy at the national 
level, for example by undermining ‘the right to choose which refugees to accept’ (B. 
Škripek, OLANO, EP 2015d; also B. Etheridge; S. Woolfe UKIP; M. D'Ornano, E. 
Ferrand, M. Le Pen FN; B. von Storch, AfD; B. Škripek, OLANO, all Fidesz MEPs J. 
Wiśniewska, PiS, EP 2015e; B. Etheridge, U. Primdahl Vistisen, EP 2015d).  
For radical right-wing populist parties, the participation off member states in relocation 
should not be mandatory and should take into account specific interests and needs of 
member states or their citizens (K.M. Ujazdowski, EP 2016o; D James, V. Maeijer 
2015e; B. Škripek, S. Briois, EP 2015e). Opposition to measures associated by 
solidarity and responsibility sharing among MS is evident in other policy areas, such as 
the Dublin system and the tendency to request penalties for the failures of states with 
external borders (e.g. K. M. Ujazdowski, M. Jurek PiS, 2016o; L. Aliot, M. Le Pen, FN 
E. Czesak, K. Złotowski, PiS, B. Škripek, OLANO, S. Woolfe, UKIP, B. von Storch, 
AfD, EP 2016p). 





For similar reasons, some of the selected parties in the EFDD and ENF groups - UKIP, 
AfD, FN and LN voted against the EBCG regulation because they believed it 
undermined national sovereignty and the capacity of states to control national borders 
(EP 2016n).  
UKIP principally supports the right for sovereign nations to control their own 
borders (T. Aker, UKIP EP 2016n) 
[…] only sovereign nations are able to manage their borders and that there is no 
freedom, security or democracy without them (D. Bilde, FN, EP 2016n) 
The only smart borders are national borders. (M. D’Ornano, EP 2016o) 
The current Frontex is to be replaced by a European Border and Coast Guard. I 
reject the resulting loss of sovereignty in a core issue, namely the responsibility 
for securing the borders. (B. von Storch, AfD EP 2016n) 
Yet, it should be noted that not all radical right-wing populist parties voted against the 
EBCG regulation. PiS, Fidezs, and OLANO voted in favour of the EBGA regulation 
and supported the expansion of Frontex, believing it would contribute to border 
protection, which is constructed as the unconditional basis for other solidarity efforts 
(EP 2016m; 2016n).  
The extension of Frontex's tasks, powers and mandate will create a European 
Border and Coast Guard to protect the EU's external borders, whether it be 
migratory pressures or other unforeseen security threats to international crime. 
(A. Bocskor EP 2016n) 
I support the creation of the European Border and Coast Guard, because I am in 
favour of rational decisions […] I completely disagree with those voices on the 
left and on the left of the European Parliament who say: "they say, 'let us not 
attach any importance to the protection of external borders, let us open our doors 
wide to immigration'. I want to say very clearly: only a Europe that is secure 
can truly show solidarity. If Europe is not capable of security, it will not be able 
to show solidarity. (K. M. Ujazdowski, PiS, EP 2016m).  
Rather than seeing the creation of EBCG a threat to national sovereignty, PiS and Fidesz 
regard it as a move that ‘is not intended to replace the efforts of sovereign states, but to 
assist them’ (K. Ujazdowski, PiS, EP 2016m). A similar consideration of national 
interests appears to underpin the support of LN for relocation, in contrast to the rest of 
the selected radical right-wing populist parties. 





Two key features of populism can be seen in the discourse of the selected radical right-
wing populist parties. First, the articulation of threats reflects the juxtaposition of 
people - in the form of citizens of their country (e.g. V. Maeijer, 2015e; 2016o), 
European citizens (B. Škripek, D, James 2015e; S. Woolfe, M. D'Ornano 2015e) or in 
the case of UKIP, ‘taxpayers’ (e.g, T. Aker, M. Parker, UKIP, EP 2016n) - and the 
Other. The interests of citizens, their security, wellbeing migrants and access to social 
protections and benefits are threatened by the presence of the migrant Other in Europe. 
In the context of migration, populist MEPs claim the policy preferences of the people 
the represent – whether nationals or Europeans – are at odds with the policies adopted 
by the European Union, because European elites are too distant from the ‘people’: 
[…]  the majority of the Dutch […] want to close the border and against taking 
in more refugees (V. Maeijer, FP, 2015e) 
Do you not realise that this is completely against the views of many – certainly 
of my constituents, but maybe even of yours? The people of the EU are not 
united behind you on this and you are enforcing something that nobody really 
wants (B. Etheridge UKIP 2016o). 
Another argument is that European elites are more likely to defend the rights of the 
migrant Other rather than the ‘people’: 
the European institutions are once again showing that they are not acting in the 
interests of the member states, but in that of illegal immigrants, reclassified as 
"refugees". This text is obviously harmful for France, whose interests remain 
my priority (S Briois, FN, EP2015e). 
These are a lot of parliamentarians who supposedly represent the inhabitants of 
the European Union and who have wasted a lot of time and money on this in 
recent months. Because the only thing you are proposing is to create more 
opportunities to come to the European Union. (V. Maeijer, FP, 2016o) 
Therefore, the discourses on migration adopted by radical right-wing populist parties 
on migration in the European Parliament reflect both the use of populist tropes but also 
key themes also present in national contexts, such as constructions of threat, hostility 
to migrants and an emphasis on controlling migration (Borriello and Brack 2019; 
Stojarová, 2018).  
 





3.2 Other populist and right-wing populist parties 
 
The discourses on migration and migration policy of parties classified by DEMOS as 
radical right-wing populist are also to a large extent shared. Constructions of border 
control (e.g. P. Mach, H. Vilimsky, EP 2016m; H. Stevens, T. Kirkhope, EP 2016n; E. 
Theocharous, EP 2016p), national sovereignty (e.g. H. Stevens, EP 2016o; J. Girling, 
J. Starbatty, R. Sulík, J. Žitňanská, R. Zile, P. Mach, EP 2016p), security, socio-
economic and cultural threats (K. Winberg, G. von Orden 2015e; H. Stevens R. 
Tomašić 2016n; J. Halla-aho 2016o A. Gericke EP 2016p) and negative representations 
of migrants (J. Halla-aho, G. von Orden 2015e; K. Winberg 2016o;) are shared among 
the ECR, ENF and EFDD groups. They also oppose Europeanised responses based on 
the principle of solidarity.  
I did not support the proposal because I fundamentally do not agree that the 
current problems with migrants should be addressed by mandatory quotas for 
their redistribution in the Member States. Quotas only exacerbate the problem 
of migrants. For a real solution, the EU's southern and eastern external borders 
need to be thoroughly sealed and central camps in North Africa and the Balkans 
need to be set up, where all migrants' asylum applications will be assessed 
individually. (Richard Sulík, ECR, EP 2015e) 
In Europe, there can only be room for real refugees, with a maximum ceiling. 
The reinforced agency will also deal with terrorism detection and prevention. 
This is important because 17 fighters from the terrorist organization Islamic 
State entered Europe under the guise of refugees - as we read in the newspaper 
this week - two of whom blew up in Paris. (H. Stevens, ECR, 2016m) 
Some of these parties are classified as radical right-wing or radical right populist 
elsewhere, such as the True Finns and the Austrian Freedom Party (Heinisch and 
Hauser 2016; Jungar 2016; Wahlbeck, 2016). Others are seen as mainstream rather than 
populist, such as the UK Conservative Party (T. Kirkhope, EP 2016n; EP 2016p).  
While the majority of the EPP group supported the proposed laws and resolution, their 
narratives are rather similar to the selected radical right/populist parties. They also 
prioritise border controls, in particular at the  external borders  so as to preserve 
European security and free movement within Schengen, believing, for example, that 
‘better controls of the external borders are necessary in order to increase internal 
security’ (e.g. P Arimont, EP 2016n; also  S. D. Pogliese, A. Cadec, M. Zver, M. 





Hohlmeier, B. Matera, T. Zdechovský 2016m;  P. Csáky, N. Morano, C. Monteiro de 
Aguiar, E. Paunova Polčák, P. Rangel, E. Vozenberg-Vrionidi A. Záborská, EP 2016n; 
A. Pabriks, M. Boni, 2016o; L. Adaktusson, M. Gabriel, F. Gambús, K. Kariņš, M-J. 
Marinescu, D. Šuica EP 2016p). Therefore, unlike ECR/EFDD/ENF groups, parties 
within the EPP group support free movement within Schengen.  Further the policy 
preferences and narratives of the EPP group reflect more closely the ‘managing 
migration’ paradigm (Geiger and Pecoud 2010) which relies both security measures 
and allowing legal routes and some access to asylum (B. Kudrika, M. Boni, R. Metsola 
2016o; B. Collin-Langen, G. La Via, S. Ribeiro, EP 2016p).  
Overall, most MEPs of the EPP group support Europeanised border control and asylum 
policies, including a mandatory relocation system, both as more effective in managing 
migration, as well as as an expression of both solidarity and common responsibility:  
The recent migratory flow has posed several problems for Member States, 
namely in terms of security and border management. The creation of a Coast 
and Border Guard tries to respond to this problem, ensuring a rigorous and 
shared management of the European Union's external borders. (C. Monteiro, 
EPP, EP2016n). 
Further, some MEPs described the EBCG proposal and the Situation in the 
Mediterranean resolution as a response to Euroscepticism and re-nationalisation (E. 
Panova, F. Ruas, EP 2016n; E. Morin-Chartier, EP 2016p), showing a degree of 
responsiveness to the policy preferences and discourses of the more Eurosceptic and 
nationalist groups of ECR, ENF and EFDD (Cristoforetti and Querton 2019). However, 
other EPP MEPs, mainly from eastern European countries oppose further 
Europeanisation. Several opposed the relocation proposal, claiming it went beyond ‘the 
joint agreement of the Member States on a one-off measure’ (M. Šojdrová, EP 2015e)  
and that relocation measures should be decided by member states rather than at EU 
level (I Štefanec, P. Svoboda, I. Winkler J. Pospíšil, A. Delahaye, EP 2015e; D. Buda, 
P. Csáky, K. Kariņš, A. Kozłowska-Rajewicz, L. Niedermayer, A. Pabriks, EP 2016p). 
In a similar manner another MEP argued that further Europeanising asylum policy was 
‘contrary to the principles of the sovereignty of individual nation-states’ and would 
damage ‘the credibility of European integration in the eyes of the Czech public’, views 
shared by several EPP MEPs (J. Pospíšil, 2016p; also S. Polčák, B. Hortefeux, A. 
Pabriks 2016p). Thus, there is less uniformity among the EPP group that suggested in 





some research (Cristoforetti and Quenton 2019) but also greater proximity to the 
positions of populist parties in the more right-wing and Eurosceptic ECR, EFDD and 
ENF groups.  
EPP MEPs also emphasise perceived security threats, including terrorism (S. Polčák, 
L. Andrikienė, D. Casa, M. Dantin, C. Monteiro de Aguiar, EP 2016n; M. Zver, H. K. 
Becker, D. Šuica A. M. Corazza Bildt EP 2016m; A. Cadec, N. Morano, A. Kozłowska-
Rajewicz, M. Šojdrová, F. Bogovič, EP 2016p). For example, one MEP referred to ‘the 
infiltration of terrorists between refugees and migrants’ (M. Zver, EP 2016o). They also 
use language designating migration akin to a natural disaster (e.g. A. Mussolini 2015e; 
C. Coelho, B. Collin-Langen, A. Plenković EP 2016p). Constructions of cultural threat 
are also present and are expressed in relation to policies that are seen as engendering 
demographic change (e.g. A. Kozłowska-Rajewicz, M.-J. Marinescu, M. Zver EP 
2016p).  
In a similar manner to radical right-wing populist parties, securitarian narratives co-
exist with humanitarian ones. For example, EPP MEPs take into account the 
preferences and qualifications of asylum seekers and the needs of vulnerable groups 
(A. M. Corazza Bildt, M. Gabriel, S. Ribeiro EP 2016p). The objective of ‘saving lives’ 
is sometimes seen as an imperative (e.g. R. Metsola, EP 2016o; M. Petir, T. Saïfi, D. 
Ivo Stier EP 2016p) that nevertheless coexists with a preference for migration controls 
and narratives of securitisation. In one extreme case the ‘securitisation/humanitarianism 
nexus’ is exemplified by the statement of one MEP who argued that  
Avoiding the loss of human lives due to the sinking of boats in the 
Mediterranean Sea is achieved most simply and efficiently by blocking them at 
gunpoint (Marian-Jean Marinescu EP 2016p)  
Statements by EPP MEPS also suggest that they prioritise the security and interests of 
Europeans over the rights of people crossing borders (G. Mato, N. Melo EP 2016p). 
Unlike radical right-wing populist parties, however, EPP also acknowledge that human 
rights and the right to asylum need to be respected (e.g. T. Comodini Cachia, F. Ruas 
EP 2016n; A. Díaz de Mera García Consuegra, A. Mussolini, T. Zdechovský, EP 
2016m; E. Morin-Chartier, F. Gambús, M. Mikolášik, S. Ribeiro, Adam Szejnfel, EP 
2016p). However, the deservingness of asylum seekers is also doubted, and it is argued 
that only ‘genuine’ refugees should be protected (e.g. P. Csáky, K. Kariņš EP 2016p). 





However, while there is some overlap with the policy preferences and narratives of the 
predominantly centre-right EPP group, discursive tropes of radical right-wing populist 
parties are equally shared by parties such as the Hungarian Jobbik, the Greek Golden 
Dawn, and the German National Democratic Party which are often characterised as 
extreme right, neo-Nazi or neofascist (Koronaiou and Sakellariou 2013; Molier and 
Rijpkema, 2018; Pirro and Róna 2019). Such parties also employ discourses of border 
control, national sovereignty, and threats to European societies (e.g. K. Morvai, B. 
Kovács, Jobbik, L. Foundoulis, G. Epitidios, GD, EP 2016n; G.Epitidios GD, U. Voigt, 
NPD, EP 2016m; N. Synadinos, GD, EP 2016o; U. Voigt B. Kovács, N. Synadinos EP 
2016p; Krisztina Morvai, EP 2015e; K. Morvai, L. Foundoulis 2015e).  
The policy of mass migration [….] leads to the alteration of the population, the 
dissolution of social cohesion, and unfortunately islamification, with the 
consequent creation of jihadi terrorist groups (N. Foundoulis, GD, 2016p) 
Migration must be prevented (not "managed"), and the primary focus of a 
European border regime must be to prevent further immigration (Udo Voigt, 
National Democratic Party, EP 2016p) 
Moreover, some of the tropes associated strongly with populist discourses, such as 
invoking the will of the people, the juxtaposition of ‘the people’ with elites and blaming 
them for migration policies that extreme right parties do not support, demonising the 
other and juxtaposing with citizens, emerge strongly in the statements of MEPs of these 
parties: 
[...] the intention for Member States to dismantle their own border guards is 
unacceptable. They should even give up their decision-making competencies. 
Brexit shows that the majority of EU citizens hardly want to go in this direction. 
Moreover, fewer and fewer people agree that the influx of unrestrained, 
predominantly economic refugees should be attracted to and received in Europe 
(B. Kovács, Jobbik, 2016n). 
Your [MEPs] life will not change in any way, no matter how many migrants 









3.3 Anti-establishment parties 
 
The four parties classified as ‘centrist’ populist’ by DEMOS provide interesting cases 
for the exploration of populist parties typologies and migration.  
Two of them (ANO 2011 and LM) belong to the ALDE group, which supports the 
Europeanisation of migration policies, including in controls of EU external borders, 
return, common asylum policies and externalised controls (e.g. J. Arthuis; G. Deprez, 
M. Pagazaurtundúa Ruiz, L. Wierinck EP 2016n; C. Wikström A. Mlinar, I. Jakovčić 
EP 2016m; P. De Backer F. Hyusmenova, Y. Toom EP 2016p). They support policies 
of control, but also stronger fundamental rights protections, strengthened sea rescue 
capacities and accountability (A. Mlinar EP 2015e; U. Paet EP 2016n; I. Jakovčić N. 
Nicolai D. Riquet EP 2016p). To this extend, the ALDE group adopts the 
humanitarian/securitarian frame, for example linking Frontex operations with search 
and rescue (I. Bilbao Barandica, R. Tremosa i Balcells, U. Paet EP 2016n; N. Griesbeck, 
N. Nicolai EP 2016p).  
In what concerns border control and security, the policy preferences and discourses of 
three of the selected anti-establishment populist parties – ANO, LM and TT – are quite 
similar to those of radical right-wing parties. They supported strengthening controls at 
the external borders of the EU, which they see as a shared responsibility, as well as 
other control policies such as returns (D. Charanzová, P. Ježek P. Telička; ANO, P. 
Auštrevičius, A. Guoga, LM, EP 2016n; P. Auštrevičius, EP 2016o; M. Dlabajová, P. 
Ježek EP 2016p).  
The common external border of the EU should be strengthened and managed 
effectively and inside the EU the Schengen rules must be obeyed (P. 
Auštrevičius, LM, EP 2016o). 
We should focus on the consistent protection of Schengen's external borders and 
the systematic collection of information on incoming immigrants (M. 
Dlabajová, ANO, EP 2016p). 
The reference to ‘collection of information on immigrants’ alludes to perceptions of 
threats posed by migration, both in terms of uncontrolled movements and security, as 
articulated in the quotes below:  





Europe is facing not only the migration crisis and enormous flow of people, but 
also threats of terrorism and potential hybrid attacks. As these are not burdens 
of singular states but of the European Union as a whole, we have to respond in 
the same manner. Also, it is our common responsibility to protect human rights 
and prevent people from losing their lives in the Mediterranean Sea (D. 
Charanzová, ANO, EP 2016n). 
The EU needs a real common border and coast guard system for our common 
European borders, otherwise Schengen will remain under pressure. The refugee 
crisis needs common European solutions and common border management is a 
key element to put a stop to the chaos at our borders (A. Guoga, LM EP 2016n). 
Similar to radical right-wing parties such as Fidesz and PiS, ANO, LM and TT 
supported a Europeanised response to border control, in the form of the European 
Border and Coast Guard (D. Charanzová, P. Ježek, P. Telička, ANO, P. Auštrevičius, 
A. Guoga, LM, R. Paksas, TT, EP 2016n). D. Charanzová’s statement also suggests a 
belief that the humanitarian aim of ‘saving lives’ should be addressed primarily through 
border controls, a trope also present in the discourses of radical right-wing populist 
parties. R. Paksas of TT supported a strengthened European Border and Coast Guard, 
although he raised concerns regarding the consent of member states and national 
sovereignty (EP 2016n). 
However, the positions of ANO and TT MEPs are rather different on Europeanised 
policies on other domains.  Similarly to radical-right wing parties, they opposed 
relocation and other proposals for Europeanised policies as infringing on the 
sovereignty of the member states:  
Although this report contained some very sensible measures to tackle the 
refugee crisis in Europe, I could not support it, as it mentions two fundamental 
issues that I consider to be completely out of the question on this subject. One 
of them is the recurring theme of compulsory redistribution of refugees, asylum 
seekers. I do not consider this measure to be functional. The second point is the 
proposal for a centrally managed asylum handling point from Brussels […] I 
believe that the responsibility for both parts should lie primarily with the 
Member States (D. Charanzová, EP 2016p) 
I do not believe that another permanent Union-wide resettlement program for 
the EU […] quotas must be abolished as a failed solution (R. Paksas, EP 2016p) 
The reasoning behind the rejection of relocation and other Europeanised policies by 
ANO and TT is the same as that of most of the radical right-wing parties discussed in 





the previous section: the perception that migration policy is a matter of national 
sovereignty and Europeanised policies infringe on this principle.  Further, R. Paksas’ 
reasons for voting against the Situation in the Mediterranean resolution similarly cite 
failures of EU policies and the prioritisation of border controls: 
The European Union does not know what to do with refugees, but the 
Community's borders remain open to illegal migrants and there is a lack of 
political will to take decisive action. Instead of preventing this, the EU 
institutions are only looking for new asylum opportunities. […] In particular, 
the EU's external borders need to be closed, there must be no more illegal 
movements of migrants between the EU's internal borders (EP 2016p). 
Advocating for entirely closed borders and opposing the entry of refugees to EU by 
invoking numbers is at odds with classifying this party as ‘weak nativist’ since such 
policy positions are usually linked to seeing migrants as a threat to be stopped at the 
border, regardless of their claims to protection. In contrast, the two LM MEPs voted in 
favour of relocation measures as an expression of solidarity and responsibility (EP 
2015e; 2016n), aligning themselves with the majority of the ALDE MEPs (e.g. M. 
Harkin, J.-M. Cavada, L. Michel, EP 2015e; C. Wikström G. Deprez 2015e; R. Tremosa 
i Balcells EP 2016p).  
The positions of M5S MEPs on migration are rather different from the other anti-
establishment parties. On the one hand, M5S MEPs voted against the EBCGA proposal 
because they considered it to undermine the sovereignty of member states (I. Adinolfi, 
F. Massimo Castaldo, E. Evi, L. Ferrara EP 2016n; I Corrao, EP 2016n).  
The old Frontex Agency, now renamed "European Border and Coast Guard 
Agency", acquires new powers, instrumental to integrated border management 
to prevent crisis situations. The changes made, however, depict a strategy that 
strongly undermines the sovereignty of the Member States, almost emptied of 
their control powers and subject, in the event of failure to implement the 
recommendations, to a series of sanctions. (I. Adinolfi, M5S, EP 2016n) 
M5S MEPs also raised concerns that the proposed regulation, in conjunction with other 
EU policies such as the Dublin system, would affect countries with external borders 
turning them into ‘a large refugee camp’ (I. Corrao, EP 2016m L. Ferrara, EP 2016n), 
which reflects the experiences of Italy as a country with external borders.  Such policy 
preferences and arguments are in line with the Euroscepticism of the EFDD as a 
political group and the prioritisation of national interests. The support of M5S for the 





relocation proposal could also be interpreted through the lens of prioritisation of 
national interests. However, M5S MEPs but it is also regarded it as a measure of 
solidarity (E. Evi, FM Castaldo, M. Zanni, EP 2015e; L. Ferrara 2015d). In the debate 
on the Situation in the Mediterranean resolution, M5S MEPs were highly critical of the 
lack of solidarity and ‘selfishness’ among MS, as well as of human rights violations 
engendered by EU policies (I. Corrao, EP 2016p), and were in favour of proposals for 
the reform of Dublin and strengthening solidarity (I. Adolfini, F. M. Castaldo, L. 
Ferrara EP 2016p). 
Unlike other selected anti-establishment parties, the MEPs of M5S explicitly reference 
weak human rights and protection-related concerns: 
The proposal for a regulation for the establishment of a European border and 
coast guard has several problematic aspects. These include the excessive 
interference in the sovereignty of the Member States and the lack of 
identification of new legal avenues or humanitarian corridors to give the 
possibility to those who would have the right to arrive safely on the territory of 
the EU. (F. Castaldo, M5S, EP 2016n; also E.Evi, M5S, EP 2016n;) 
Human rights are violated everywhere and, last but not least, this agreement 
with Turkey (I. Corrao, EP 2016o) 
M5S preoccupation with safeguarding refugee protection and human rights, also 
reflected in the amendments they submitted, differentiates them from other parties in 
the EFDD group which display a much greater hostility to migration.   
3.4 Left-wing populist parties 
 
The positions and discourses of MEPs of the selected three radical left-wing populist 
parties (LFI, Podemos and SYRIZA) are very different than those classified as radical 
right-wing or anti-establishment. Their discourses are largely shared among the 
GUE/NGL group, although there are differences in terms of how they positioned 
themselves and voted in specific proposals.  
MEPs from the selected parties were critical of border and migration control policies. 
LFI, SYRIZA and Podemos opposed the emphasis on controlling migration inherent in 
EU policies of border management, return, detention, as well as externalised asylum 





and border control policies, (e.g. M. Urbán Crespo, T. González Peñas Martínez, 
PODEMOS; M.-C. Vergiat, J.-L. Mélenchon, LFI, 2016n; S.Kouloglou, SYRIZA EP 
2016m; S. Sakorafa 2016o; X. Benito Ziluaga, L. Sánchez Caldentey PODEMOS,  J.-
L. Mélenchon,  Y. Omarjee, LFI EP 2016o). EU policies are opposed because they 
prevent access to protection and fail to safeguard the lives and rights of migrants at 
Europe’s borders (e.g. M. Urbán Crespo, L. Sánchez Caldentey, PODEMOS, M.-C. 
Vergiat Jean-Luc Mélenchon, LFI 2016n; S.Kouloglou, S. Sakorafa, SYRIZA, EP 
2016m; X. Benito Ziluaga, PODEMOS, Le Hyaric, Jean-Luc Mélenchon LFI, EP 
2016p). All parties referred to such justifications in their rejection of the EBCG 
regulation: 
The EBCG is the multiplication of Frontex, in capacity and autonomy, to 
prevent the entry of migrants fleeing war and poverty […] To the extent that it 
goes in the opposite direction to the values that identify us, such as the defence 
of the right to a dignified life of all people regardless of their origin or condition, 
I vote against the Pabriks report. (all PODEMOS MEPs, EP 2016n) 
More than 3,700 people died last year in the Mediterranean and at least 3,000 
people lost their lives there this year. Yet carrying out rescue operations is not 
the EU's priority. (M.-C. Vergiat, LFI, EP 2016n). 
On the positive side is the deletion of Frontex operating returns from third 
country to third country, there is compliance with fundamental rights and a 
mention of search and rescue. Despite, the positive points, I have abstained as 
Frontex is not an agency aiming at saving lives. (S. Kouloglou, SYRIZA, EP 
2016n). 
Further, some MEPs mentioned the need to address the broader causes of forced 
migration, including military interventions (J-L. Melencon, LFI, 2015e; K. 
Chrysogonos, 2015e; S. Sakorafa SYRIZA, 2016p).   
Instead of turning to a foreign policy that tirelessly seeks stability and respect 
for human rights in the areas of origin of these desperate migratory movements, 
combined with a reception policy worthy of the essential values of this Union, 
what is proposed it is, once again, a refusal policy (all PODEMOS MEPs, EP 
2016n) 
Obviously, stopping the European interventions that sowed regional Syrian 
chaos and forced these populations into exile is by no means part of the 
reflection on the causes of these massive waves of immigration. (J.-L. 
Mélenchon, LFI, EP 2016n) 





Similarly, opposition to the EU-Turkey deal as an instrument which prevents access to 
Europe and refugee protection was the reason PODEMOS and LFI voted against or 
abstained the Situation in the Mediterranean resolution (e.g. T. González Peñas, E. 
Torres Martinez, PODEMOS, Y. Omarjee M.-C. Vergiat, LFI, EP 2016p).  These 
policy positions and narratives, consistently with the content of the amendments 
submitted by SYRIZA and LFI, focused support, human rights provisions, safe routes 
into Europe, stronger integration policies and taking into account the preferences of 
refugees (L. Sánchez Caldentey, M. Urbán Crespo, PODEMOS, S. Kouloglou, 
SYRIZA, M-C. Vergiat, LFI, EP 2015e;  M. Urbán Crespo, L. Sánchez Caldentey, 
PODEMOS, M.-C. Vergiat, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, LFI 2016n; S.Kouloglou, S. 
Sakorafa, SYRIZA, EP 2016m; X. Benito Ziluaga, PODEMOS, Le Hyaric, Jean-Luc 
Mélenchon LFI, EP 2016p). 
While all three parties oppose the expansion of border and migration controls, they 
support Europeanised policies. Relocation was seen as a measure of solidarity towards 
the most affected members of the EU, Italy and Greece, and believed the mechanism 
should compulsory and permanent (e.g. L. Sánchez Caldentey, PODEMOS, S. 
Kouloglou, SYRIZA, Y. Omarjee, LFI, EP 2015e; P. Iglesias, PODEMOS, K. 
Chrysogonos SYRIZA, 2015e; 2016o).  For the same reason, while they oppose the 
Dublin system as a mechanism that undermines solidarity among member states (J. 
Couso Permuy, EP 2016p), they supported Europeanised responses to migration based 
on solidarity that would strengthen access to asylum (S. Sakorafa, SYRIZA, EP 2016o; 
K. Chrysogonos, S. Kouloglou, SYRIZA, Y. Omarjee, M-C. Vergiat, LFI, EP 2016p). 
These positions do not suggest a strongly Eurosceptic approach to migration policy.  
Despite the largely shared policy preferences and discourses, the selected left-wing 
populist parties sometimes differed in the position on the three legislative documents 
analysed here.  With the exception of J.-L. Mélenchon who abstained from the vote on 
the Relocation decision as it did ‘not solve any of the causes of these forced departures’ 
(EP 2015e), other LFI, PODEMOS and SYRIZA MEPs voted in favour. While 
PODEMOS and LFI parties voted against the EBCG regulation, SYRIZA abstained 
citing concerns over the re-establishment of border controls within Schengen and 
alluding to Greek-Turkish tensions over borders (K. Chrysogonos, S. Kouloglou, EP 
2016n). Similarly, SYRIZA MEPs voted for Situation in the Mediterranean resolution, 





while PODEMOS and LFI abstained because of the resolution’s support for migration 
control measures and insufficient emphasis on protection and human rights, with the 
exception of J.-L. Mélenchon who voted against for the same reasons (K. Chrysogonos, 
S. Kouloglou, SYRIZA, J.-L. Mélenchon, P.Le Hyaric, LFI, X. Benito Ziluaga, J. 
Couso Permuy, PODEMOS, EP 2016p). 
Other MEPs within the GUE/NGL group largely share the policy positions and 
discourses of the three selected populist parties (e.g. M. Albiol Guzmán, M. Björk, J. 
Pimenta Lopes, 2016m; M. L. Senra Rodríguez, Á. Vallina, M. Anderson, L. Boylan, 
L. Ní Riada, J. Ferreira, EP 2016n; M. Albiol Guzmán, B. Spinelli 2016o; T. 
Hadjigeorgiou, A.-M. Mineu D. de Jong, N. Sylikiotis, M. Viegas, EP 2016p). Overall, 
there is little differentiation between the policy positions and discourses of the parties 
within the GUE/NGL group classified as populist by the DEMOS project and other that 
are not. Some MEPs from the United Left–Initiative for Catalonia Greens were 
additionally more explicit in objecting to securitarian policies such as fingerprinting (P. 
López Bermejo, L. Senra Rodrígues 2016n). Significanlty different positions seem to 
come from MEPs of the Czech Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia who 
opposed relocation arguing that solidarity should be voluntary, aligning with the 
position of the Czech government, and against the EBGC regulation because of 
sovereignty rather than human rights concerns (K. Konečná, J. Maštálka, EP 2015e; EP 
2016n).     
Although there are no selected populist parties on the Socialists & Democrats and Green 
groups, it is worth summarising their discursive constructions and positions on 
migration for comparative purposes. S&D MEPs strongly support Europeanised 
policies, solidarity among member states – for example relocation - greater support for 
member states with external borders (e.g C. Tapardel, I. Thomas 2016n; C. Chinnici K. 
Fleckenstein, T. Szanyi I. Iotova, EP 2016o; F. Assis, V. Blinkevičiūtė, C. 
Schaldemose, G. Willmott, EP 2016p)233. They are highly critical of member states that 
obstruct such efforts (e.g. A. Gomes, S. Post, E. Schlein, EP 2016o; F. Assis, I. Thomas, 
EP 2016p). They also support strengthening the protection of external borders, 
including through the expansion of Frontex capabilities, as a matter of common EU 
 
233 Slovak MEP Monika Smolková was the only one dissenting from the support for relocation (EP 
2016p) 





policy, externalised control policies such as the EU-Turkey deal and cooperation with 
third countries to prevent departure (e.g. E. Andrieu, C. Moraes, EP 2016n; S. Cabezón 
Ruiz, C. Sorin, I. Ujhelyi EP 2016p; J. Weidenholzer, S. Guillaume, C. Kashetu 
Kyenge, I. Yotova, EP 2016o). Narratives of European security, preventing crime and 
terrorist threats are also present and underpin the emphasis placed on border control 
and combatting smuggling (S. Bonafè, M. Dalli, V. Maňka, EP 2016n; M. Flašíková 
Beňová, J. Zemk, EP 2016m; A. Mamikins, C. Molnár, EP 2016p). 
At the same time, S&D MEPs they emphasise the importance of adhering to human 
rights and refugee protection law, as well as preventing loss of lives, establishing legal 
routes, and are critical of states that do not adhere to human rights norms– such as 
Greece and Visegrad states (J. Geier, P. Toia, E. Schlein, EP 2016o; Z. Balčytis, J. F. 
López Aguilar, M. Dalli, I. García Pérez, G. Willmott, EP 2016p). However, in contrast 
to the GUE/NGL groups, S&D MEPs found the provisions on SAR and fundamental 
rights in the parliament’s agreed text on the EBCGA regulation satisfactory and tend to 
conflate security and humanitarian objectives (E. Andrieu, I. Thomas, J. Ward; EP 
2016p; C. Revault D'Allonnes Bonnefoy, J. Weidenholzer, EP 2016o). Hence, the 
positioning of S&D reflects, on one hand the humanitarian/securitisation nexus and a 
migration management approach rather than one purely based on control and 
deterrence.  
Most Green MEPs opposed, similarly to the GUE/NGL group, the expansion of 
Frontex’s powers and the curtailment of access to asylum and human rights, and 
supported Europeanised asylum policies enhancing solidarity, creating legal routes and 
strengthening sea rescue (M. Andersson, D. Škrlec, EP 2016n; S. Keller, B. Valero, EP 
2016m; B. Ropė, EP2016p; S. Keller, B. Valero, EP 2016o). Yet two MEPs from 
Eastern European countries positioned themselves in favour of the EBCGA proposal, 
supporting enhanced border protection and other control measures, highlighting yet 
again the impact of national positions and geographical divisions (B. Ropė of the 
Lithuanian Peasant and Greens Union, I. Šoltes, Verjamem, Slovenia, EP 2016m; EP 
2016p). 
 







The analysis of the amendments process suggests that the selected radical right-wing 
populist parties, with the exception of Fidesz discussed below, have very little impact 
on formal policy making processes in the European Parliament. As this analysis have 
highlighted, no amendments by Front National, Lega Nord, Freedom Party, OLANO 
or PiS were incorporated in texts adopted by the parliament. One explanation is that the 
political groups these parties belong to – ECR, EFDD and ENF – do not have enough 
MEPs for their amendments to be successful at the level of the Committee responsible 
for the legislative text to be agreed by the Parliament. Moreover, none of the selected 
parties participated in amendments sponsored by multiple political groups which were 
often successful. Radical right-wing populist parties tend not to co-sponsor 
amendments with other party groups – co-sponsorship is limited to MEPs of the same 
political group, and even within the same party in the case of PiS. A further explanation 
is that the submitted amendments often proposed policies that are hard-line in policy 
preferences and content (Hurka 2013) and thus failed to garner support from other 
groups. In addition, proposed amendments sometimes reflected narrow national 
interests, which rendered them unlikely to be supported in the context of legislation that 
reflect European law-making (Baller 2018; Hurka 2013). The findings overall reflect 
existing research which has highlighted the significance of consensus on policy across 
political groups for policies to be adopted by the European Parliament (Baller 2018; 
Hurka 2013; Lopatin 2015).  
In contrast, the findings suggest that Fidesz benefited to an extent from belonging to 
the EPP political group, the largest in the European Parliament.  However, their 
amendments were successful only in one of the three legislative processes, on the 
EBCG regulation. In this case, the policy preferences in favour of the proposed 
regulation aligned with the majority of the EPP group. In contrast, amendments 
proposed by Fidezs independently in the Relocation decision, where the position of 
Fidesz opposed that of EPP, were unsuccessful. The same lack of success can be 
observed in the Situation in the Mediterranean resolution, although it is difficult to 
offer a conclusive explanation for this, given that the overall rate of success of 
amendments by any political group was low.  





Submitting amendments with the other MEPs of the same political group appears to be 
an important factor for other selected populist parties. ANO’s successful amendments 
were submitted with other ALDE MEPs, suggesting yet again that alignment with the 
core policy positions of a political group is a significant factor. Similarly, two of the 
three selected radical left-wing populist parties were particularly active in submitting 
amendments compared to both radical right-wing and anti-establishment populist 
parties (Table 2). While amendments submitted by LFI with other MEPs of the 
GUE/NGL group had limited success, the grouping of SYRIZA with GUE/NGL MEPs 
was the most successful among all selected populist parties in having amendments 
adopted in the Committee stage, although less so in the final texts produced by the three 
processes. A further explanation is that the content of the amendments proposed by left-
wing populist parties overlaps with those submitted by other political groups. For 
example, an amendment (Am 94, EP 2015a) to the Relocation decision included 
references to family ties, qualifications and skills and integration were also proposed 
by MEPs of the S&D and EPP groups. Given the Parliament’s emphasis on consensus 
and the rapporteur’s tendency to seek compromise (Hurka 2013), this might have made 
the amendments proposed by populist left-wing parties, and more broadly GUE/NGL, 
more likely to be adopted. 
It should also be noted that populist left-wing and some anti-establishment parties were 
far more active in submitting amendments. While left-wing populist parties are often 
characterised as Eurosceptic (Ivaldi 2018; Sotiropoulos et al 2020), they are far more 
actively involved in parliamentary policy making than radical right-wing populist 
parties. Further, SYRIZA played a central role within the GUE/NGL, as they were 
involved in the majority of successful amendments. M5S, while also described as a 
Eurosceptic party also submitted many amendments to the EBCG and Situation in the 
Mediterranean proposals. While less successful overall than the radical-left populist 
parties, the adoption of some of their amendments in the EBCG legislative process 
might reflect that they were aligned in content with those of other political groups. 
In what concerns policy preferences and discourses, many commonalities can be 
observed across populist parties and political groups. The selected radical right-wing 
populist parties are strongly in favour of policies predicated on controlling migration 
such as strengthening the external borders of the EU, detention, deportation and 





externalising asylum and migration controls. Yet, such policies are also supported 
across political groups of the centre-right, centre and centre-left such as EPP, ALDE 
and S&D, suggesting a convergence among centrist political groups around prioritising 
border control (Frid-Nielssen 2018; Lopatin 2013). Similarly, criminalising and 
securitised constructions of migrants, representing them as a threat to the security and 
economic wellbeing of European societies, and othering discourses – focusing for 
example on the juxtaposition of Islam and Christianity– are more pronounced among 
the selected radical right-wing parties but are also present in the discourses of 
mainstream parties in the EPP group, as well as by a minority of MEPs in the ALDE 
and S&D groups. Conversely, support for policies that strengthen human rights 
provisions and institutional accountability is shared not only among the radical left-
wing populist parties but also among the wider GUE/NGL group as well as the S&D, 
Greens and ALDE groups. 
A stronger feature of radical-right parties seems to be their overt hostility to human 
rights regimes and the inclusion of migrants. Radical right-wing parties are more likely 
to support policies that undermine human rights and access to protection and oppose 
policies related to integration, which would blunt inequalities between citizens and 
migrant populations. Yet, while policy proposals by MEPs of other political groups 
tend to comply with existing legal norms, exemplifying another area of convergence 
(Frid-Nielssen 2018; Lopatin 2013), there are exceptions. MEPs of ‘mainstream’ 
parties within the ECR group, such as the UK Conservative Party and of parties in the 
EPP group, proposed policies that are contrary to EU and international law, such as the 
suspension of access to asylum, the toleration of pushbacks or the erosion of access to 
legal assistance and information. Given that such proposals relate to the concept of 
authoritarianism as a central analytical dimension in populism – since they in essence 
undermine liberal democratic norms – the field of migration policy highlights 
authoritarian tendencies that are not limited to parties classified as populist.  
Findings related to another key policy dimension – the preference for either national or 
Europeanised migration policies – suggest a degree of divergence among radical right-
wing parties.  Overall, they oppose the erosion of national powers in the field of 
migration, in line with the characterisation of such parties as Eurosceptic (Borriello and 
Brack 2019). However, the analysis showed that they tend to adopt different positions 





depending on the policy domain of the proposals, national policy preferences and 
national interests. Hence, Fidezs, OLANO and PiS supported the EBGA regulation, 
since they regarded border controls, especially at the external borders, as necessary for 
preventing the entry to Europe of populations which they regard as threatening. This 
reflects Eastern European national politics and discourses on migration since 2015 
(Karamanidou, Hess and Kasparek 2020; Witold 2017). However, FN and UKIP did 
not follow suit, instead showing a stronger opposition to Europeanised controls. 
Similarly, Lega Nord supported relocation measures as they were seen as beneficial for 
the national interests of Italy, while most radical right-wing populist parties opposed 
relocation as a measure, seeing it as an option that would erode national sovereignty. 
The same divergence can be seen in parties classified as anti-establishment populist. 
ANO, TT and LM supported the establishment of EBCG as a measure that enhanced 
border control, while M5S opposed it on the grounds that it would threaten national 
sovereignty (also Borriello and Brack 2019). While ANO and TT were against the 
creation of a relocation mechanism, M5S saw it as an expression of solidarity among 
member states, although its position could reflect considerations of national politics, as 
Italy is a state with EU external border. Equally mainstream parties in other political 
groups were more likely to support Europeanised policies, but this differs among 
political groups and the policies in question.   
To sum up, the analysis found significant commonalities in policy preferences and 
discourses among populist parties – in particular among the selected radical right-wing 
and anti-establishment ones – as well as across populist and non-populist parties across 
political groups. This might be suggestive of populism as a ‘thin’ ideology (Mudde 
2004; 2007) which allows for diverse policy preferences and discourses shaped by 
political ideologies, national contexts and the dynamics of European Union policy 
making. Yet, the divergence of policy preferences and discourses among populist and 
non-populist parties renders classificatory schema of parties as populist problematic in 
providing insights into EU migration policy making, at least in the context of the 
European parliament. For example, while parties such as SYRIZA or LFI have been 
labelled as ‘radical’ by the DEMOS project (Sotiropoulos et al 2019; Sotiropoulos et al 
2020) and others (for example, Halikiopoulou et al 2019; Kioupkiolis and Katsambekis 
2018), there is little evidence of this in terms of their migration policy preferences. 
Rejecting the further reinforcement of external border controls or the expansion of 





Frontex capabilities cannot be seen as a radical position in itself – compared to, for 
example, border abolition or abolishing Frontex. Likewise, supporting policies aimed 
at strengthening human rights protections can hardly be described as radical, since they 
reflect core values of the European Union, embedded in its legislative texts (European 
Parliament 2021). 
However, the analysis also raises questions regarding the absence or presence of 
conceptual features of populism in discourses on migration in the European Parliament. 
Populist tropes such as those invoking the people, condemning the elites and 
constructing the ‘other’ as threatening are present in the discourses of the selected 
radical right-wing populist parties but also in parties classified as extreme right, such 
as Jobbik and Golden Dawn and mainstream political parties in other political groups. 
Further, the findings of this analysis suggest that nativism, associated in particular with 
radical right-wing parties, is strongly present in the discourses of three of the selected 
anti-establishment parties – ANO, TT and LM – each classified as ‘weak nativist’. The 
support of these parties for stronger migration controls, adoption of securitising 
narratives and – with the exception of LM – opposition to relocation is similar to the 
policy positions and discourses of radical right-wing parties. Rather than ‘weak 
nativism’, that suggests hostility to migration and exclusionary tendencies. In the case 
of ANO, existing research has evidenced such tendencies at the domestic level 
(Strapáčová and Hloušek 2018; Čulík, 2017; Hanley and Vachudova 2018). It is also 
worth noting that P. Jezek, one of the MEPs heavily involved in some of the legislative 
processes, appears to be an advocate of the overtly racist and white supremacist 
‘replacement’ theory (Davey and Ebner 2019). While TT has been previously 
characterised as non-xenophobic (Ramonaitė and Ratkevičiūtė 2013), R. Paksas’ – 
albeit limited – contributions to the three legislative processes analysed here also 
signify support for control policies and exclusion of migrants from Europe (EP 2016n; 
2016p). While considering such parties ‘weak nativist’ might be informed by broader 
considerations of their history and political positioning as anti-establishment populist 
parties, it seems to underplay nationalist and xenophobic policy preferences and 
discourses.234  
 
234 Sotiropoulos et al (2019:18) claim, for example, that ANO’s nativism ‘represents a 
mere political marketing’ despite evidence of nativism in their discourse.  
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